Observers have sounded the alarm bell for a number of years now that democracy is under threat. Just as many democracies once thought to be resistant to erosion (such as the United States and India) are on the defensive, many autocracies (such as Russia and China) are both hardening their systems of internal control and rising in global influence. The confluence of these developments initially took many off-guard, particularly in light of the widespread optimism about the future of democracy that spread following the end of the Cold War. 

In “Autocracy, Inc.,” Anne Applebaum illuminates the important—and yet largely underemphasized—role that international economic factors have played in enabling the growing strength of dictatorships. Leveraging a deep body of illustrative cases, Applebaum paints a vivid portrait of the contemporary autocratic landscape, explaining the important ways in which contemporary autocrats differ from their predecessors. Applebaum’s account highlights the key role of kleptocratic financial institutions in buttressing autocratic rule by providing the autocratic leadership class with vast sources of illicit wealth. 

This system has created a web of autocracies linked together through corrupt practices that work together to help prop each other up. Applebaum emphasizes that rather than operating as a bloc—as during the Cold War—today’s dictatorial regimes create alliances that mirror the networks among large corporations (hence the book’s title, “Autocracy, Inc.”). To maintain control, the members of Applebaum’s Autocracy, Inc., use new digital technologies to surveil citizens, spread propaganda, and carry out smear campaigns about their opponents. They go to great lengths to reinforce the messaging of the other autocracies in the network because they believe the downfall of any one member of the system poses a risk to the survival of the others. 

The ultimate enemy of the members of this network is democracy, both the ideas it is associated with—freedom, transparency, accountability, and justice—and the governments that support its spread. 

A core problem, however, for the regimes that form Autocracy, Inc., is that the language of democracy will always be attractive to at least some sectors of their citizenry. As such, to maintain control, they must seek to discredit the ideas that underlie democracy wherever they emerge. They do so by leveraging the technologies of the new digital era to surveil their citizens (often under the guise of combating crime, given that many of these tools are dual use) and to generate propaganda favorable to their rule and that of their allies (and unfavorable to democracies). As an example of these linkages, Applebaum describes the ways in which the media industry in China is closely tied to media outlets in a variety of autocracies. The goal of these cooperating regimes is the same: to reinforce messages that serve the interests of Autocracy, Inc., and undermine democratic ideals. 

In their effort to emphasize the dangers of the democratic alternative, the regimes in Autocracy, Inc., seek to create a narrative that their model of rule leads to stability and prosperity, in contrast to the chaos that is typical in democracies. Autocrats expect that this narrative will trickle down to ordinary citizens, influencing how they view not only their own governments but also those of autocracies and democracies around the globe. Applebaum shows how this strategy has at times been quite effective. To take one example, she documents how support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine gained substantial traction among ordinary citizens in some parts of Africa. 

Moreover, though autocratic smear campaigns against domestic opponents are nothing new, Applebaum offers evidence of the degree to which they work. Using both anecdotes and interviews with activists targeted by such campaigns, she illustrates how this tactic can lead to disillusionment and frustration among pro-democracy movements, in some instances prompting their leaders to go into exile. Yet even exile is no longer a safe option for pro-democracy activists today, given that Autocratic, Inc., regimes have become quite effective at carrying out transnational repression too.

Of course, the influence campaigns of the regimes in Autocracy, Inc., are not limited to autocratic audiences. Applebaum documents how these campaigns target democracies, as well, in order to “exaggerate the divisions and anger that are normal in politics.” By stoking polarization and promoting extreme political voices, they seek to create chaos. Many others have flagged this development, but Applebaum’s account highlights how it is occurring through collaboration among the Autocracy, Inc., network, as part of a concerted effort to undermine their democratic rivals.

In short, today’s network of autocratic governments poses a serious threat to democracy around the globe. Improved understanding of these governments’ methods of operation is thus critical if democracies are going to withstand the dangerous challenge they present.

Relying on an impressive number of detailed case studies and enriched by firsthand interviews, “Autocracy, Inc.” offers a rich and troubling account of the corrupt networks that prop up many of today’s autocracies and the important roles that private, profit-seeking actors play in sustaining these regimes. Several of the dynamics central to Applebaum’s argument are worth highlighting.

First, she contends that the origins of Autocracy, Inc., lie in the optimistic sentiments of some key political actors, including former U.S. President Bill Clinton and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, following the end of the Cold War that trade and diplomacy would pave the way for political liberalization. The idea floating in some pro-democracy circles at the time was that greater interconnectedness and engagement between democracies and autocracies would cause the latter to pursue genuine political reforms: Economic liberalization and integration would essentially lead to meaningful political liberalization. Yet, as Applebaum writes, few actors at the time discussed the potential for the reverse outcome—that such links would instead enhance autocracy. The book discusses the rise of Vladimir Putin in Russia to illustrate this point, arguing that few observers properly emphasized the role of legitimate Western organizations in fostering Putin’s rise, whether by enabling, profiting, or covering up his corrupt schemes to amass wealth.

Second, the book suggests that ideology is no longer required for autocratic regimes to join forces with one another, as has been presumed to be true in years past. Instead, the primary thread that connects the autocracies in the Autocracy, Inc., network is a shared lust for power and wealth, and with it a shared perception that democracy poses a grave threat to their ambitions. As Applebaum writes, their links to one another “are cemented not through ideals but deals.” These deals help the leadership maintain power, even in the face of substantial international pressures. The toughest international sanctions, for example, are rendered impotent for those in Autocracy, Inc., given the strong bonds among them that ensure that in practice they are never truly isolated. This message is illustrated through the close linkages Applebaum documents between regimes as ideologically distinct as the Iranian theocracy and Venezuela under Hugo Chavez and later Nicolas Maduro. The ideology that they use to justify their rule is unimportant, given that what unites them is the shared belief that democracy is the enemy because it threatens their ability to secure more wealth and power. 

As with any thought-provoking analysis of contemporary global politics, the book raises a number of questions that it leaves unanswered. For one, as Applebaum notes, not all of the world’s autocracies are members of Autocracy, Inc. Rather, this network includes a subset of roughly 40 autocratic regimes, most notably those in Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela. What determines whether autocracies belong to this illicit network? Is membership available to all who are interested? Do underlying institutional or economic structures or the distinct threats regimes face to their rule influence whether they are a part of it? Gaining insight into the conditions that affect whether autocracies join forces in the manner Applebaum describes would be valuable moving forward, particularly for identifying whether this network is likely to expand or contract in the years to come. 

Second, Applebaum notes that the leaders of the governments that form Autocracy, Inc., prioritize wealth and power. How do these two factors interrelate? Does corruption incentivize leaders to seek greater power consolidation (because it enhances their ability to engage in corrupt acts with impunity), or does power concentration incentivize leaders to rely more on corruption (because it is an efficient method for buying the loyalty of a narrow base of supporters)? Or potentially both? For example, it is possible that autocratic leaders mainly want power but must pursue corrupt wealth-maximizing activities as a means of padding the pockets of the elites around them in order to secure their loyalty. In other words, political survival—rather than getting rich—may be the ultimate goal for an autocratic leader, and achieving that goal may require corruption. In Venezuela and Iran, for example, buying off the security apparatus has been critical to the survival of both regimes, and corruption is what has enabled them to do so. It is difficult to know whether such activities represent a regime truly motivated by wealth or are instead an indicator of a regime intent on maximizing political survival. Disentangling these relationships is by no means necessary for the book’s message to be persuasive but, rather, something future work could consider.

Lastly, Applebaum points out the ways in which members of Autocracy, Inc., have ratcheted up repression as a means of silencing their critics. Is an increase in repression inevitable, in that more corruption leads to more citizen discontent with the regime and ultimately more crackdowns? Or are there alternative models of corrupt autocratic rule that do not entail heavy-handed repression? Is entrenchment of corruption in an autocracy a red flag suggesting increases in repression will soon follow? This is also not critical to the book’s argument but something future work could consider. 

Applebaum notes that the world’s leading autocrats believe they are winning in their battle against democracy and the ideals that underlie it. Given the wealth of evidence the book offers detailing their multipronged approach to undermining their democratic adversaries, this impression certainly bears important elements of truth. Rather than leaving readers with a feeling of helplessness, however, Applebaum closes the book with a concise and compelling road map of the strategies today’s democracies should pursue to shift the battle in their favor.

First, she emphasizes the need to reframe the defense of democracy as a war against “autocratic behaviors” rather than autocratic regimes. This is a refreshing take on how to tackle the contemporary autocratic challenge, given that it deflects from potentially inflammatory narratives (e.g., a battle against Iran) and puts the focus instead on specific tactics autocrats pursue that are harmful (e.g., a battle against corruption), campaigns against which are likely to attract broader public support. 

Second, Applebaum urges those in the pro-democracy community to join forces to more effectively fight against corruption, improve intelligence channels to reduce transnational repression, and craft better campaigns to discredit authoritarians’ false narratives. 

Third, Applebaum makes the case that a concerted effort to significantly reform the international financial system is a must. Of course, the powerful people benefiting from the existing system will fight hard to preserve it, as Applebaum acknowledges. But her book persuasively argues that implementing reforms to reduce transnational kleptocracy is a critical first step for weakening the foundations of today’s leading autocratic regimes. While empirically we do not know whether enactment of such reforms would set in motion the collapse of these regimes, at a minimum it would decrease global corruption, a goal worth pursuing on its own.

Applebaum also argues that democracies should take their economic dependence on autocracies more seriously and engage in more meaningful efforts to loosen those linkages. They should pursue, as well, a more concerted fight for “evidence-based conversations,” such as by implementing laws that regulate social media. The focal point for the latter could potentially be on the need to protect ordinary citizens and give them greater control and choice. 

“Autocracy, Inc.” identifies key ways in which a wide range of private actors and institutions—many of which are based in democracies, including real estate agents, banks, and business owners—perpetuate autocratic rule today by enabling or fostering kleptocracy. In highlighting how these kleptocratic linkages buttress a collaborative network of autocracies, Applebaum’s book points the way to developing actionable strategies for reducing the illicit wealth that helps sustain them.

– Erica Frantz is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, where she studies authoritarian politics, democratization, and the dynamics of political change. Her most recent book is “The Origins of Elected Strongmen” (Oxford University Press, 2024). Published courtesy of Lawfare.